Explorations in Economic Research, Volume 2, number 1 by Geoffrey H. Moore
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research





Publication Date: December 1975
Chapter Title: Productivity, Costs, and Prices: New Light from
an Old Hypothesis
Chapter Author: Geoffrey H. Moore
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c7402
Chapter pages in book: (p. 1 - 17)1
GEOFFREY H. MOORE
National Bureau of EconomicResearch and
Hoover InstitutionStanford Univerclty
Productivity, Costs,and Prices:
New Light froman Old Hypothesis
ABSTRACT:Changes in productivity,costs, profits, and prices since
1961 are examinedin the light of the hypothesis formulatedby Wesley C. Mitchell in 1913,to the effect that a prolongedperiod of prosperity
tends to generate inefficienciesin a private enterpriseeconomy. They arise partly from thereactions of workers to the betteremployment
opportunities, wages, and fringe benefitswith which they are faced,
and partly fromthe reactions of businessenterprises to their own
prospects and opportunities Thegrowth of these inefficienciesreduces
productivity, raises costs, and thehigher costs get reflectedin prices. In the initial stages ofa cyclical expansion prices usuallyrise faster than
costs, but after a time the rise inprices is not sufficient to cover therise in costs in industrygenerally, and profit marginsdecline in many
industries. This is an importantfactor reducing incentivesto invest, and increasing the chances ofrecession, as firms seekto cut costs.
Nevertheless a recession,even a mild one, sets in motion forcesthat tend to eliminate theproduction inefficiencies thatdeveloped during prosperity, and to lower therate of inflation. Some of theseresults begin to appear during therecession, others become evidentonly
NOTEThis paper was presentedat the Pacific Northwest RegionatEconomic conference, Seattle, Washington, April 26, 1974. An earlierdraft was presented at a conkrenceon an Agenda for Economic Research on Productivity held bythe National Commissionon Productivity, Washington, D.C, April6, 1973. I am indebted to jerome Markand William Eisenberg of theU.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,to Fe!iks Tamrn of the U.S. Bweau ofEconomic Analysis, and to VivianBaits, Walterbanks, Jane Formars., and H. Irving Forman of the NationalBureau for their expertassistance in the preparation of thispaper. I am grateful also to Charloite lioschan,
Solomon Fabricant, John Kendrick,and Victor Zarnowitz for their comments and suggestions. I have benefitedtoo from the opportunity to read AnthonyT Ctuff's doctoral dissertation "Prices, Unit LaborCosts and Profits--An Examinationof Wesley C Mitchell's BusinessCycle Theory for the Period 1947-1969," George Washington University,june 1970. tndeed, his work antici- pated marry of the resultsset forth here.
1during the ensuing recovery. ¶ A detailedreview suggestc that the
period t 961 --69 fits this descriptiono the expansion and boom phase,
while 1969-72 fitsthe recession-recovery phase. During1973 an
acceleration in costs as well as in prices beganagain, with l)flceS
initially rising faster than costs. Toward the endof the year costs had
begun to rise faster than prices.
Inthefirstquarter of i974 the output of the economy-_realGNP
declined at an annual rate of closeto 6 per cent and the price level
advanced at a rate ofmore than 10 per cent. Since eriiployment in the first
quarter was about the same or a little higher thanit was in the fourth
quarter and the workweek declined only slightly,output per man houror
productivity_dropped sharply. Since hourlyearnings continued to ad-
vance in the first quarter, labor costs per unit ofoutput advanced sharply.
As a matter of fact, in the firstquarter productivity in the nonfarni sector
declined at an annual rate of around 31/2per cent, a very sharp decline,
while unit labor costsrose at an annual rate of around 11 percent, or
slightly faster than the price level.
As I reckon it, with the end of thefirst quarter we had just completed
one year of a gro'th recession. A marked slowdownin economic growth
began early in 1973, continued throughthe rest of the year, becomingan
actual decline in activityaided andabetted by the energy situation
around November, 1973. The slowdownin growth was accompanied,
as such slowdowns have been in thepast, by a reduction in the rate of
productivity growth. Since therewas no slowdown in the rise ofwages,
labor costs per unit ofoutput began to accelerate during 1 973and the
acceleration continued through thefirst quarter of1 974. Thus we
entered upon a cost inflationas well as a price inflation.
This is particularly unfortunatebecause, by the end of 1972,a great deal
of progress had been madein the direction of stabilizingcosts of produc-
tion. This fact was not widelyrecognized at the time. Nevertheless, during
1972 the statistics for allnonfinancial corporations combined showthat
unit labor costs rose only 3per cent, that other costs fell nearlyone per
cent, and therefore that totalcosts per unit of output rose onlytwo per
cent. This low rate of increase,together with somerecovery in profits per
unit from the level to which theyhad declined, was compatiblewith, and was in fact accompanied by,an inflation rate of 3 per centor less. This
achievement in the direction ofcost stabilization, which had favorable
implications for our competitiveposition in foreign marketsas well as for
inflation at home, hasnow been dissipated. I believe thestabilization was,
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in part, a delayed effect of the 1969-70 recession and the cost-saving,
productivity-enhancing efforts that the recession generated. If we are to
learn from such experiences we need to know something about the way
such developments come about and what their consequences are. To this
endIshalltry to show how, in the course of a cyclical boom and
recession, productivity, costs, and prices interact with one another, ac-
celerating in one phase, stabilizing in another.
My hypothesis about this process goes back to the one formulated by
Wesley Mitchell more than sixty years ago, in 1913. Mitchell was one of the
founders of the National Bureau of Economic Research and directed its
research for many years. Although he formulated this hypothesis in 1913,
and the Bureau was not born until 1 920, many of the investigations by the
Bureau over the years have pertained to it.Briefly, the hypothesis is that
during the course of a boom the general level of prices advances with
increasing speed, but at the same time inefficiencies in production develop
that raise costs even faster than prices, reducing profit margins and
expected future profits, and eventually discouraging further expansion. As
the boom subsides into recession, cost-cutting becomes a dominant theme
iii business enterprises. Productivity begins to pick up here and there as
!abor turnover diminishes and the uncertainty of employment reinforces
discipline. Costs per unit of output decline, or at least rise less rapidly.
Prices do likewise, but nonetheless profit margins begin to improve.
Spurred by the better profit outlook, enterprises expand output and capital
investment. This further aids the advance in productivity and retards the
increase in unit costs of production and prices. A new expansion in
economic activity gets underway, and economic growth is resumed under
less inflationary conditions than prevailed when the previous expansion
ended.
The period 1961-69 fits this description of the expansion-boom phase;
1 969-72fitsthe recession-recovery phase. Of course, governmental
policiesfiscal, monetary, defense, manpower, etc.played a major role
in the character and timing of this process as it unfolded. At the same time,
the private sector was itself generating forces in the directions indicated,
and these forces operated at times in concert with and at times in
opposition to the policies adopted. Or, to put it differently, in some ways
or on some occasions, the policies were consistent with and supportive of
developing tendencies in the private sector, sometimes in opposition to
them. The boom of 1961-69 was not allowed to carry so far as to produce
a financia! crisis, an occurrence more common in Mitchell's time than
today. Government policies helped bring the boom to a halt before that
stage was reached. Nor was the process of recession in 1970 allowed to
carry so far as to lead to deep depression, which was also more common
in Mitchell's day. Government policies intervened decisively long beforethat stage. Nevertheless,Ithink the hypothesis does explainsome of the
significant forces at work.
Let me begin by recalling the relevantpassages from Mitchell's summary
of his theory.' Ishall quote them at length because,as I hope to demon-
strate, they are extraordinarilyperceptive in the context ofrecent experi-
ence, beginning with the end of themild recession of 1961.
'A revival of activity," Mitchell said,"...starts with this legacy from
depression: a level of prices lowin comparison with the prices ofprosper-
ity, drastic reductions in thecosts of doing business,narrow margins of profit.
"For reasons that willappear in the sequel, such conditionsare accom-
panied by an expansion in thephysical voJume of trade. Thoughslow at first, this expansion iscumulative.
"Even when a revival ofactivity is confined at first withina narrow range
of industries or withinsome single section of thecountry, it soon spreads to other parts of the businessfield. For the activeenterprises must buy more
materials, wares, andcurrent supplies from otherenterprises, the latter from still others, andso on....Meanwhile allenterprises that become busier employmore labor, use more borrowedmoney, and make higher profits.Family incomesincrease and consumers' demandexpands, likewise in ever wideningcircles.... All this while, the revival of activity
is instilling a feeling ofoptimism among businessmen,and this feeling both justifiesitself and heightens theforces that engenderedit by making everyone readier to buy freely.
"While the price levelis often sagging slowlywhen a revival begins, the
cumulative expansion in thephysical volume of tradepresently stops the fall and startsa rise. For, when enterprises havein sight as much business as they can handle with theirexisting facilities of standardefficiency, they stand out for higherprices on additional orders.This policy prevails. because additionalorders can be executedonly by breaking innew hands, starting old machinerybuying new equipment,or some other change that entails increasedexpense. The expectation of itscoming accelerates the advance. Buyersare eager to obtain or tocontract for large supplies while the low level ofquotations continues, and thefirst definite signs ofan upward trend ofquotations bring a sudden rushof orders.
"Like the increase in thephysical volume ofbusiness, the rise ofprices spreads rapidly;for every advanceof quotationsputs pressure upon someone to recoup himselfby makinga compensatory advance inthe prices ot what he hasto sell. The resultingchanges in pricesare far from even, not only as among
different commodities butalso as among different parts of the system ofprices. Retail prices lagbehind wholesale,the prices of stapleconsumers' behind the pricesof staple producers'goods, and the prices of finished productsbehind the pricesof their raw materials.Wages
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rates rise sometimes more slowly than commodities and sometimes more
rapidly; interest rates on long loans always move skiggishly in the early
stages of revival, while the prices of stocksparticularly of common
stocksboth precede and exceed commodity prices on the rise. The
causes of these differences in the promptness and the energy with which
various classes of prices respond to the stimulus of business activity are
found partly in differences of organization in the markets for commodities,
labor, loans, and securities; partly in the technical circumstances affecting
the relative demand for and supply of these several classes of goods; and
partly in the adjusting of selling prices to changes in the aggregate of
buying prices a business enterprise pays, rather than to changes in the
prices of the particular goods bought for resale.
"In the great majority of enterprises, larger profits result from these
divergent price fluctuations combined with larger sales. For, while the
prices of raw materials and of wares bought for resale usually, and the
prices of bank loans often, rise faster than selling prices, the prices of labor
lag far behind, and the prices that make up overhead costs are mainly
stereotyped for a time by old agreements concerning salaries, leases, and
bonds.
"This increase inprofits, combined with the prevalence of business
optimism, leads to a marked expansion of investments. Of course, the heavy
orders for machinery, the large contracts for new construction, and so
forth, that result swell still further the physical volume of business, and
render yet stronger the forces that are driving prices upward.
"While the processes sketched work cumulatively for a time to enhance
prosperity," Mitchell continued, "they also cause a slow accumulation of
stresses within the balanced system of businessstresses that ultimately
undermine the conditions upon which prosperity rests. Among them is the
gradual increase in the costs of doing business. The decline in overhead
costs per unit of output ceases when enterprises have once booked all the
business they can handle with their standard equipment, and a slow
increase in these costs begins when the expiration of old contracts forces
renewals at the high rates of interest, rent, and salaries that prevail in
prosperity. Meanwhile variable costs rise at a relatively rapid rate. Anti-
quated equipment and plants that are ill-located or otherwise work at some
disadvantage are brought again into operation. The price of labor rises, not
only because standard rates of wages go up, but also because pay for
overtime is higher. More serious stillis the decline in the efficiency of
labor, because overtime brings weariness, because of the employment of
'undesirables,' and because crews cannot be driven at top speed when
jobs are more numerous than men to fill them. The prices of raw materials
continue to rise faster on the average than the selling price of products.





Finally, the numerous smallwastes, incident to the (oncitictof business enterprises, creep up whenmanagers are harried bya Press of orders demanding prompt delivery.
"A second stress," Mitchellpointed out, "is theaccumulating tensionin the Investment andmoney markets. jThisJis unfavorableto the con- tinuance of prosperity,not only because highrates of interest reducethe prospective margins of profit, butalso because they checkthe expansion in trade out of whichprosperity developed. Manyprojected venturesare relinquished or postponed,either because borrowersconclude that the interest would absorbtoo much of their profitsor because lenders refuseto extend their commitmentsfarther.
"One importantgroup of enterprises suffersan especially severe check from thiscause in conjunction with highprices_the group thatdepends primarily upon the demandfor industrialequipment. In the earlierstages of prosperity, this group usuallyenjoys a season ofexceptionally intense activity. But when themarket for bondsbecomes stringent,andwhat is often moreimporfant_vhen thecost of construction hasbecome high, business enterprises andindividual capitalists alikedefer the executionof many plans for extendingold and erectingnew plants. As aresult, contracts for this kind ofwork become lessnumerous as the climax of prosperity approaches Thenthe steelniiljs,foundries, machine factories, Copper smelters, quarries,lumber mills,cement plants. constructioncom- panies, generalcontractors and the like findtheir orders for futuredelivery falling off.
"The imposing fabricof prosperity is builtwith a liberal factor ofsafety; but the largergrows the structure themore severe become theseinternal stresses. The only effectivemeans of preventing disasterwhile continuing to build is to raise sellingprices time after time highenough to offset the encroachments of costsupon profits, to cancel theadvancing rates of interest, and to keepinvestors willing tocontract for freshindustrial equipment.
"But," says Mitchell,in a sentence thatseems hard to believe nowadays,
"it is impossible to keepselling prices risingindefinitely. In default ofother checks, the inadequacyof cashreserves would ultimately compelthe banks to refusea further expansion of loansupon any terms.But before this stage has beenreached, the rise ofprices is stopped by theconse- quences of its own inevitableinequalities. The inequalitiesbecome more glaring the higherthe general level isforced; aftera time they threaten serious reduction ofprofits to certain businessenterprises, and the troubles of these Victims dissolvethat confidence inthe security of creditswith which the wholetowering structure ofprosperity has beencemented. "As prosperityapproaches its height then,a sharp contrast develops among the businessprospects of differententerprises. Many, probably the
Imajority, are making niore money than at any previous stage of the
business cycle. But an important minority, at least, face the prospect of
declining profits.
"Now such a decline in profits threatens graver consequences than the
failure to realize expected dividends. For it arouses doubt concerning the
security of outstanding credit. Business credit is based primarily upon
capitalized value of present and prospective profits, and the credit out-
standing at the zenith o prosperity is adjusted to the great expectations that
prevail when trade is enormous, prices are high, and men of affairs
optimistic. The rise in interest rates has already narrowed the margins of
security behind credits by reducing the capitalized value of given profits.
When profits themselves begin to waver the outlook becomes worse.
"Thus prosperity ultimately brings on conditions that start a liquidation
of the huge credits it has piled up."
Mitchell then goes on to account for the development of financial crises,
differentiating between those that remain mild and those that degenerate
into panics. The crisis stage is followed by depression, and we can pick up
his summary at this point.
"A period follows during which depression spreads over the whole field
of business and grows more severe. Consumers' demand declines in
consequence of wholesale discharges of wage earners, the gradual exhaus-
tion of savings, and reductions in other classes of family incomes. With
consumers' demand falls business demand for raw materials, current
supplies, and equipment used in making consumer goods. Still more severe
is the shrinkage in investors' demand for construction work of all kinds,
since few individuals or enterprises care to sink money in new business
ventures as long as trade remains depressed and the price level is declin-
ing.
"With the contraction of trade goes a fall in prices. For, when current
orders are insufficient to employ the existing equipment, competition for
what business is to be had becomes keener. This decline spreads through
the regular commercial channels that connect one enterprise with another,
and is cumulative..
"Of course, the contraction of trade and the fall in prices reduce the
margin of present and prospective profits, spread discouragement among
businessmen, and check enterprise. But they also set in motion certain
processes of readjustment by which depression is gradually overcome.
"The variable costs of doing business are reduced by the rapid fall in the
prices of raw materials and of bank loans, by the marked increase in the
efficiency of labor that comes when employment is scarce and men ate
anxious to hold their jobs, and by closer economy on the part of managers.
Overhead costs are also reduced by reorganizing enterprises that have
actually become or that threaten to become insolvent, by the sale of other
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enterprises at low figures, byreduction in rentals arid refunding of loans,
by charging off haddebts and writing down depreciatedproperties, and by
admitting thata recapitalization of businessenterprisescorresponding to the lower prices ofstockshas been effectedon the basis of lower profits.
"While costs are thus stillbeing reduced, demand forgoods ceases to
shrink and then beginsslowly to expand.... Accumulated stocks left over from prosperityare gradually exhausted, andcurrent consumpton requires
current production. Clothing,furniture, machinery, and othermoderately durable articlesthat have been usedas long as possible are finally
discarded and replaced.Population continues to increaseat a fairly uniform rate: thenew mouths must be fed and thenew backs clothed. New tastes appearamong consumers and new methodsamong producers, giving rise to demand fornovel products. Most importantof all, investment demand for industrialequipment revives; for thoughsaving may slacken it does not cease,with the cessation offoreclosure sales andcorporate reorganizations theopportunities to buy into oldenterprises at bargain prices become fewer,capitalists become less timidas the crisis recedes into the past, the lowrates of interest on long-termbonds encourage borrowing theaccumulated technicalimprovements of severalyears nlay be utilized, andcontracts can be let on highlyfavorable conditionsas to cost and promptexecution.
"Once these variousforces have set tradeto expanding again, the increase proves cumulative,though for a time thepace of growth is kept slow by thecontinued sagging of prices.... Business prospects become gradually brighter.. Everything is ready for a revival of activity,which will begin wheneversome fortunate circumstancegives a sudden fillipto demand, or, in theabsence of suchan event, when the slowgrowth of business has filledorder books andpaved the way fora new rise in prices......
How well doesMitchell's theory describeand account for thedevelop- ments since 1961 withrespect to productivity,economic growth, and inflation? Thanks to theextensive development ofeconomic statistics during thepast half-centurywe are far better fortifiedthan he was sixty years ago with statistical databearing upon theprocesses involved. The recession of1960-61 reducednational output slightlyduring a period of abouta year. The revival beganearly in 1961 andwithin a few months productionreached new high levels.The price levelwas much Slower torespond.as Mitchell notedwas typically the case. Theindustrial wholesale price indexsagged until early1963 and then begana gentle rise that did notaccelerate until thesecond half of 1 964.Unit labor costs also continued stable until1965. long-terminterest rates declineduntil the end of 1962, rose slightlyduring 1963, andbegan climbingrapidly in 1965. Profits, however,picked up promptlywith the revival inactivity in 1961.I
The revival in output spread from one industry to another, and from one
enterprise to another. In September 1960 nearly allof the 24 major
industries covered in the industrial production index were dedining; by
May 1961, just eight months later, all were expanding. In the first quarter
of 1961 only about half the companies in the Dun & Bradstreet sample of
manufacturing, wholesaling, and retailing concerns reported sales higher
than a year ago; a year later, 80 per cent reported rising sales. Improve-
ments in profits also spread hand-in-hand with rising output and sales. This
was because of the reduction in costs, since selling prices were much more
sluggish. During 1961 more price indexes for manufactured goodswere
declining than were rising, and the proportion rising did not get much
above 50 per cent until 1963. Thereafter the proportion mounted in steps
until early 1966 when nearly all industry prices were goingup.
Wage rates, as represented by compensation per man-hour, rose faster
than prices all through the period 1961-65 at the rate of about three to four
per cent per year, but showed little or no tendency to accelerate. Produc-
tivity, as measured by output per man-hour, reached a very low ebb during
the 1960-61 contraction, but picked up quickly with the revival in output
in 1961 and continued to advance at a rate of around four per cent per
year until 1966. As a result, the high rates of increase in unit labor costs
during the 1961 recession were reduced virtually to zero over the next four
years. The trend in nonlabor costs per unit of outputthat is, costs such as
depreciation, interest payments, and business taxeswhichare largely in
the nature of overhead costs, was more sharply downward, reflecting both
the steadiness of interest rates and the spreading of relatively fixed costs
over larger output. Total costs per unit of output in the nonfinancial
corporate sector of the economy exhibited a stable or slightly declining
trend during the first four years of the expansion. Even though priceswere
not rising rapidly, they were rising faster than costs, and this kept the trend
of profits per unit of output upward. Total profits benefited not only from
the rise in output but also from the improvement in margins.
Meanwhile, capital utilization rates were rising and the unemployment
rate was falling. Overtime hours in manufacturing rose rapidly in 1964 and
1965, and so did job vacancies as reflected in the volume of help-wanted
advertising. The quit rate accelerated from 1964 to 1966an indication
that jobs were becoming easier to get, and also that labot costswere
beginning to rise because of turnover. Costs of materials also began to rise
in1 96.4. A vigorous expansion in housing construction and in plant and
equipment investment contributed to the increase in output as well as to
the developing pressures on the labor market and the markets for industrial
materials.
The low point iii total unit costs in the corporate sectorwas reached in
the fourth quarter of 1965. This was also the low point in unit labor costs.
Productivity. Costs, arid Prices 9The low in unit nonlabor costs came one quarter later. From that point on,
costs not only rose, hut rose faster than prices.
All this corresponds extraordinarily well with Mitchell's description of a
revival and the early stages of a business expansion: prompt increase in the
physical volume of production and in profits; iniproved productivity and
lower costs; lags in prices, wages, and long-term interest rates; the recov-
ery becoming more widespread among enterprises and industries as it
proceeds; and an emerging upswing in prices, costs, and interest rates. The
timing and magnitude of this upswingwas, of course, affected by the
government's fiscal and monetary policy, and especially by the 1964 tax
cut, the sharp increase in niilitary expenditures in connection with Viet-
nam, the large new social welfare programs undertaken at the same time,
and an accommodating increase in themoney supply. But the effect of
these policy moves depended in partupon the climate in which they were
made, and the climate was developing along the lines of the Mitchell
hypothesis.
Once costs per unit of output started rising faster than prices--in the
corporate sector as a wholethis situation persisted for the next five years,
from 1966 to 1970. Moreover, itwas true not only of labor costs, but also
of nonlabor costs. h the case of nonlaborcosts, the rapid rise in interest
rates and in the amount of business debt to carry inventories and tocover
capital expenditures was clearly an important factor. Moreover, with
output rising less rapidly than it had been earlier in the expansion, its effect
on fixed charges per unit was less favorable. As unit costs accelerated after
1965 the price level did also, but it did not keepup with costs, and unit
profits declined. By the fourth quarter of 1969, when businessactivity as a
whole reached its peak, unit profitswere 29 per cent lower than they had
been in the fourth quarter of i965. Although thecorporate price level had
climbed IIper cent over the same period, total costs per unit of output
had gone up 20 per cent, or nearly twiceas much.
Both labor and nonlabor costs contributed to this 20per cent rise, with
unit labor costs rising 19 per cent and unit nonlaborcosts, 23 per cent.
Output per man-hour rose only eightper cent, while compensation per
man-hour rose 29 per cent. Compared with the preceding fouryears of the
expansion, productivity rose less than half as fastas before, while hourly
wages rose nearly twice as fast.
Thus the inflation in costs resulted,as Mitchell had clearly indicated,
both from a change in the efficiency of doing businessand from a bidding
up of the prices of labor, raw materials, and loan capital. As unemploy-
ment declined, shortages of skilled workers available for full-timeemploy-
ment became more acute. Between 1965 and 1969, full-timeemployment
of nonfarm workers increased eightper cent, compared with 11 per cent
from 1961 to 1965, whereas part-time employmentincreased 24 per cent
1
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shift in the skill mix is indicated by the fact thatemployment of adult men
rose five per cent from 1965 to 1969while employment of adult women
rose 17 per cent, and employmentof teenagers rose 21 per cent. In view of
the normal differences in productivity of these groups,this represented a
substantial dilution of the employed work force) Theamount of labor
employed at overtime rates continued at a high levelthroughout the period
1965-69. Moreover, the number ofnonfarm workers with a job but
not at workbecause of strikes,absenteeism, holidays, etc.accelerated
sharply: the number rose 28 per cent during 1965-69 comparedwith 14
per cent from 1961-65. The amountof time lost through strikes as a
percentage of estimated working time, a factorbearing on efficiency as
well as on the acceleration of wages, rose only slightly between 1 961and
1966, but then moved to much higher levels in 1967-69.Most of the
characteristics of the later stages of a business boom thatMitchell de-
scribed in 1913 can be recognized in the statistics pertaining to1965-69.
Why did the rise in the price level not keep up with the riseiii costs? The
factors that Mitchell pointed tothat in some industriesthe increase in
capacity to produce exceeds the expansion in themarket for its products,
that in other industries prices are held back by publicregulation, custom,
or long-term contracts, that thehigh level of interest rates checks borrow-
ing for new construction and the resulting difficulty inplacing contracts
restricts the demand for materials and suppliesno doubtoperated in this
period too.I would add international competition tothis list of factors
inhibiting the rise in prices, for other countries were notexperiencing the
retardation in productivity growth that was occurring in theUnited States.
In manufacturing, where the growth rate in US. output perman-hour was
cut from four per rent in 1960-65 to two per cent in1965-69, the growth
rate in ten other industrialized countries rosefrom five to more than six per
cent. Even though foreign wage rates also rose morerapidly than United
States wage rates, the productivity difference was decisive.As a result, unit
labor costs during 1965-69 rose more than four times asfast in the United
States as in the ten other countries.4
Whatever the reasons why prices did not keep upwith costs, they were
not peculiar to just a few industries.Corporate profit and sales data for the
22 major manufacturing industries showthat in each year from 1966 to
1969 a majority of the industriesexperienced declines in the ratio of profits
to sales. In 8 of the 22, marginsdropped continuously during this period.
In only one industry, lumber, weremargins higher in 1969 than in 1966.
The encroachment of costs upon prices waswidely felt.
Then came the much debated recessionof 1969-70; debated as to
whether it was a recession, debated as to itsseverity, debated as to its
causes, debated as towhether it was really necessary, and debated as to
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without taking a positionon most of these issues, but I shall confine myself
to one point. That is thatthe cost-price-profit developments duringthe
recession and subsequentrecovery resembled those that have charac-
terized earlier recessionsand recoveries, including those describedin
Mitchell's account. Thispoint is certainly controversial enough,because
many observers have taken theposition that price-wage developments
during the 1969-70recession were unique.
The facts seem tome to support the following conclusionswith respect to this period:
The recovery inproductivity growth began duringthe recession and continuedintothe recovery.Thisprocess,whereby some of the inefficiencies builtup during a period of prosperityare eliminated during
recession, was described byMitchell as one of theways in which de- velopments duringa recession..namely the reductionin costspave the way for recovery.
The recovery inproductivity reduced therate of increase in unit labor costs. Thisreduction also started duringthe recession and acceler- ated during therecovery. The increase inproductivity was farmore potent in stabilizing unit laborcosts than was the change in hourlycompensation, which showedno tendency to decelerate duringthe recession and rela- tively little thereafter.s
The rate of increasein nonlabor costsper unit of output leveled off during therecession, but no reductionoccurred until therecovery got underway. Then, however,the reductionwas sharp. One reason for the lag was that long-term interestrates did not undergo theirdramatic drop until the recessionwas almost over. Therecovery in output played itsusual role in spreading fixedcosts once therecovery began.
Total costs per unitshowed some declinein rate of increase during the recession, but thebig drop occurredafter the recoverygot underway. Unit labor costsand nonlaborcosts both madecontributions to this pattern.
Profits per unit ofoutput continuedto decline throughoutthe recession, but began risingpromptly when therecovery began. The price leveldecelerated slightly duringthe recession,and more sharply after therecovery got underway.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0Now although thereare important differencesbetween this description of cost-price-profitchanges during oulmost recent recession andrecovery and Mitchell's1913 description, thereare basic similaritiesalso. To conclude the comparison,since we began witha description of the position at the outset ofthe 1961-62recovery, which is thepoint in the cyde where Mitchell'saccount begins, letus now compare the1971-72 recovery with that of1961-62.
In bothcases, the rate of inflationin the price levelwas reduced considerably, and therewas a slight reduction in therate of inflation in the wage level.In both cases,a sharp recovery inoutput per man-hour occurred, whichmaterially reduced therate of inflation in unitlabor costs. In both cases, therate of inflation in unitnonlabor costswas cut sharply. ln both cases, therate of inflation iii totalcost of productionwas reduced to around oneper cent or less. In bothcases, a situation in whichcosts were rising much fasterthan prices had beeneliminated, reversingthe decline in unit profits. Thus,it seems tome, if the legacy of the1960-61 recession,as described earlier inthis paper, isreasonably faithfulto Mitchell's analysis, the samecan be said of thelegacy of the1969-70 recession. During 1973,as I have already noted,
an acceleration incosts as wellas in prices beganagain, but pricescontinued to risefaster than costsuntil the end of theyear. Then the situationturned about, withcosts beginningto rise faster thanprices. The acceleratedrise in costs isan unfavorable development. Ifwe are to avoid the
consequences that Mitchellpointed out so manyyears ago, we needto pay some attentionto the forces he described and drawwhat lessonswe can fromour experience withthem. What, then,are these lessons ofexperience? Thosethat I wouldstress, based on thepreceding analysis,are as follows:
Changes inproductivity arisefrom a widevariety ofcauses, many of which areassociated withthe businesscycle. Thesechanges havean important bearingupon costs of productionas well as on prices;upon profits andincentives toinvest; and therebyupon inflation andupon economic growth.The businesscycleprocess, particularlyin thecom- prehensive frameworkconceived byWesley Mitchellmany years ago, brings into close
interrelationshipproductivity,economic growth,and inflation.
A period ofprosperity, particularlywhen it isprolonged, tendsto generate inefficienciesin a privateenterpriseeconomy. Theyoriginate partly fromthe reactionsof workersto the betteremploymentoppor- tunities, wages, andfringe benefitswith whichthey are faced,and partly from thereactions ofbusinessenterprises to theirown prospects and opportunities. Thegrowth of these
inefficiencies reducesproductivity,
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important, but often neglected, part of the process of inflation.
Inevitably, it seems, the rise in prices after a time is not sufficient to
cover the rise in costs in industry generally, and profit margins decline.
This is one of the (actors reducing incentives to invest, increasing the
chances ot recession, and restricting economic growth. Nevertheless, a
recession, even a mild one, sets in motion forces that tend to eliminate the
production inefficiencies that developed during prosperity. This tends to
reduce costs and lower the rate of inflation. Some of these results begin to
appear during the recession, others beconie evident only during the
ensuing recovery.
Since no one would consider it desirable, other things equal, to
abbreviate periods of prosperity and prolong periods of recession, policies
should be directed specifically to the tendencies associated with these
periods with a view to offsetting their detrimental effects and promoting
their beneficial effects on productivity and costs.Inpart, this means
developing ways of directing attention currently to what is happening,
what the consequences are likely to be, and what may be done about it.I
have long felt that the job of providing this information, diagnosis, and
policy prescription was a highly useful role for the National Commission
on Productivity.
Finally, there is a major need for studies of productivity-cost-price
relationships during periods of prolonged prosperity or full-employment.
What are the inefficiencies that arise in such periods? Why do costs
eventually rise (aster than prices? What influence does international com-
petition have on this process? How are different industries affected? How
are different plants within industries affected? In order to tackle these
questions effectively, better data on productivity, costs, and prices by
industry are needed. Itis a striking fact that although we have global
measures of the kind I have used in this paper, only 10 per cent of the
private sector is covered by regularly published productivity indexes by
industry. In the government sector, despite the recent progress with pro-
ductivity measurement in federal agencies (accounting now for almost half
of federal employment), state and local government is virtually untouched
Since the latter comprises around 80 per cent of total government em-
ployment, productivity measures have thus been applied to only 10 per
cent of the government sector. Thus only 10 per cent of the privaie sector
and only 10 per cent of the government sector are now being measured on
a detailed basis. This is not enough. In particular, I think attention should
be given to measurement in the corporate sector, because of the possibility
of getting comparable data on productivity, cost, price, profit, and capital
investment. Many of the larger companies presently construct measures of
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their own productivityon a quarterly basis, anda thorough examinationof these data, condüctd,of course, in sucha way as to avoiddisclosijre of confidential information, shouldhelp to illuminate theshort-run productjv ity developments thathave so largean effect upon nationalproblems
Some research attentionshould also be givento policies thatwould induce or promotecountercyclical behavior ofproductivity andcosts. The slowdowns in productivitygrowth and theacceleration in costsof produc- tion that regularlyrecur during business cycleexpansions could perhapsbe averted or at least subduedby appropriate policyactions. Most workon business cycle policieshas been devotedto counteringrecession. It is time to recognize the needfor counteringsome of the tendenciesthat develop during booms. Thisis less obvious andperhaps more difficult,but certainly no less important,as I have tried to showwith the aid ofWesley Mitchell's insight.
Although it isa rare event ineconomics that a man'sresearch should help materiallyto explain eventssome sixty years later,the fact thatthis does happen shouldbe an inspirationto those whoengage in, provide data for, and otherwiseSupport new workon business cyclesas well as on productivityi hope itis an inspirationalso to thosewho are training themselves to takepart in economicresearch, Who knows,perhaps some sixty years hencesomeone will be able topoint to theresearch now getting underway atNBER-West not farfrom whereMitchell's ownresearch began, that hashelped him tounderstand themodest economicproblems that may haveSurvived to 2034.
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